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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: IS IT IN THE UNITED STATES' STRATEGIC INTERESTS TO REMAIN A NON-MEMBER?
After initially supporting efforts through the 1990s to help develop the International
Criminal Court (ICC), the United States notified the United Nations it would not become a member of the ICC and would have no legal obligations stemming from the U.S. signature on the preliminary founding documents of December 2000. This paper will evaluate whether the United States would accomplish more strategically by joining the ICC or by remaining external to it and pursuing its own course against crimes against humanity. This paper will look at the history of the ICC development, the current U.S. position, and analyze whether we are better off strategically as a member or non-member.
HISTORY

The International Criminal Court traces its history back to the International Military
Tribunals of Germany (Nuremberg, 1945) and the Far East (Tokyo, 1946) , tribunals convened to deal with Nazi and Japanese war criminals. In 1946, as a result of the atrocities committed during World War II, the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was approved. A year later, the UN invited the International Law Commission (ILC) to investigate the possibility of and the potential need for an international judicial organization to prosecute those accused of that crime. Over the next five years, the ILC developed several proposals but could not assemble a consensus on the need for a permanent court to prosecute violators. Nothing was done for 35 years until, in 1989, Trinidad and Tobago asked the UN General Assembly to resurrect the idea with a specific eye to prosecuting crimes arising from international drug trafficking. 1 It is interesting to note that the reason that relaunched the ICC, international drug trafficking, is not one of the crimes that now subject to its jurisdiction.
In the early 1990s, greater impetus may have been gained for the formation of a full time court as a direct result of the need for ad hoc tribunals to deal with the ethnic cleansing in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (1993) and the atrocities committed in Rwanda (1994 Another serious concern for the United States is unequal application of the justice meted out by the ICC. As the world's only super or hyper-power, the United States fears exposure to trumped up charges from rogue nations like Libya or Non-Governmental Organizations that don't agree with actions taken in our national security interests. During the 1998 negotiations, Libya was adamant that seizure or freezing of assets, like they experienced as an inducement to resolve culpability for the Lockerbie, Scotland, airplane terrorism incident, should be included in the crimes punishable by the ICC. Obviously, the majority of nations categorically rejected such outlandish demands.
The U.S. concern is somewhat borne out by the NGO's publicly demonstrating during the final conference in Rome, demanding George H.W. Bush be held accountable for the blood bath of the Gulf War in 1991 and that William J. Clinton be charged with "genocide" based on deaths resulting from the sanctions against Iraq during his administration. The demonstrators may have gained more credibility had they also demanded justice be meted out for the Chinese
Politburo members who ordered the shootings in Tiananmen Square in 1989 instead of focusing solely on alleged U.S. transgressions. But, from the U.S. perspective, due to its pre-eminence in the world, it is the one that will be singled out if, and when, the jurisdiction of the court is expanded, a real possibility since there is no oversight body to restrict expansion of the judicial "mandate".
COMPLICATIONS WITH A CAPTURED WAR CRIMINAL
The issue of the proper resolution once you've caught a war criminal subsumed the media headlines on December 13, 2003 , with the capture of Saddam Hussein. The news was abuzz with speculation on how he should and would be dealt with. Early on, it was pointed out that the newly established ICC would be an ideal solution, except that most of his crimes occurred before the creation of the court, which only has jurisdiction on events that happened after its Studies "While we oppose the ICC we share a common goal with its supporters-the promotion of the rule of law. Our differences are in approach and philosophy. In order for the rule of law to have the true meaning, societies must accept their responsibilities and be able to direct their future and come to terms with their past."
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The United States believes that countries gain much more by confronting their own horrific demons, using the errors of the past to help in the formulation of an effective government to guide them into the future, a cornerstone of which must be a viable judicial system to address transgressions. The issue with using the WCT is that the Iraqi Governing Council was appointed by the coalition that defeated Iraq, not the Iraqi people themselves through an elective process. That could give rise to issues of the legitimacy of any actions taken by the WCT.
There is always the option to request a United Nations Security Council Resolution The ICC only has one solution to aberrant behavior-a court trial. Those nations external to the ICC have more options for resolution. The rebuilding nation can resolve the issue "Through formal trials, through truth commissions combined with amnesty, through political process, or in exceptional cases through special tribunals." 14 In South Africa after the end of apartheid, rather than continue the divisiveness through criminal proceedings, the populace opted for reconciliation through truth commissions to heal the nations wounds more quickly. It appears to have been successful.
Another advantage to the U.S. position is that it requires an international consensus to be established, usually through the UN Security Council, before tribunals can be instigated.
Conversely, the ICC only needs a single prosecutor to convince two members of a three-judge panel to begin investigations and proceedings. The threshold for prosecution by the ICC is too low and may be easily influenced by external factors. (UCMJ) and may face a harsher punishment since the death penalty is an option under the UCMJ but not the ICC. In many of the developing countries that may follow in the U.S.
footsteps, the judicial system is corrupt or non-existent and they would have no effective internal mechanisms to deal with transgressors without turning to an external organization like the International Criminal Court. This is specifically why the ICC was brought into fruition but these nations may lose out on the opportunity if they follow the U.S. lead and do not sign onto the
Treaty of Rome.
And what of our typical allies who have signed the Treaty of Rome-all of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations except the Czech Republic and Turkey, all of the seven nations with pending membership to NATO (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia), and our perennial ally, Australia. How are they to view the United States, not only as an ally, but also as the world leader? Many of our Allies feel they have stepped out, relinquishing some of their sovereignty, to help build an institution that is in the long term interests of the entire world. After its strong leadership during the 1990s to lay the foundation of the ICC, they don't understand why the United States doesn't now join them to that end. To blunt ASPA's impact on our allies, it was written with Presidential waiver authority.
Additionally, the U.S. is actively pursuing bi-lateral agreements 17 to exempt U.S. service members, as well as relying on pre-existing SOFA with allies. From their national viewpoint, they must wonder about the necessity of special waivers or of a bi-lateral agreement with their ally just because they acted in their national interests and signed on with the ICC.
Turning to our usual opponents who have not yet joined the ICC-China, Iran, Libya, and
North Korea, we've provided them a windfall for their rhetoric machines. The U.S. opposition to the ICC could be portrayed as 'because we are only interested in protecting our mercenary forces from prosecution for their war crimes' or 'even the U.S. recognizes that the ICC is so flawed that it is has no credibility and should have no standing to prosecute war criminals in any country'. Speculation? Certainly, but still a credible scenario of their potential United States and ICC bashing. In the first case, they could use our retreat from the ICC as further grounds to easily criticize any of our worldwide military efforts, from the invasion of Iraq to the humanitarian effort in Iran after the most recent earthquake. They could claim the United States won't join because it needs to protect the U.S. "mercenary" troops who would be subject to prosecution by the ICC for the atrocities they inflict upon the populace wherever they go. In the second example, it would play well if the ICC were to press a case against any member of those nations. The United States should never change its position because we end up on the same side of the issue as our usual opponents, but it should generate some serious questions about the path we're on and the reasons we've chosen it.
In the recent past, when U.S foreign policy was guided solely by security and economic national interests, the United States has usually regretted it in hindsight. Take for example, the United States clearly states in the National Security Strategy that "We will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to … protect Americans are not impaired by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which we do not accept." States announced its withdrawal from the Statute of Rome-"The president has also made it clear that we respect the right of other states to be part of the ICC, but we ask them in return to respect our right not to be a part of the ICC process" 19 It appears to many that the United States it communicating from two positions-respect the U.S.'s right not to join and to continue getting military aid, but you must act incongruent with your previous actions in support of the ICC.
To make matters worse, the U.S. projects the appearance of an antagonistic attitude toward the Court, and to some degree, those that are a member of it. Congress enacted and the President signed , the American Service-Members Protection Act ( There is an undeniable element of anti-Americanism in international law as it is developing today. Rivkin and Casey argue quite persuasively that "the impetus in international law today stems from both our allies and our adversaries, who have chosen to use it as a means to check, or at least harness, American power."
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A possible scenario could be a perceived U.S. need to intervene militarily in a nation suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Based on the U.S. stated policy of pre-emption for threats to our security, the United States would then act. Any nation that opposed our actions could bring charges before the ICC of war crimes, which could be loosely interpreted under Article 8 of the Rome Statute as:
"iii-Willful causing of great suffering or serious injury to body or health. 
AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION: HOW TO MINIMIZE U.S. EXPOSURE
The overall tone of this paper has been that it is in the U.S. national interests to become a member of the ICC yet to try to avoid some of the detracting factors. According to the Independent Student Coalition for the International Criminal Court website, "The United States was instrumental in the Rome conference that drafted the original Rome Statute in 1998. As a leading voice for the ICC at Rome, the American delegation pushed through extensive protections for its sovereignty, its servicemen based abroad, and its citizens. The US led the debate on the inclusion of strict rules of procedure and evidence for the Court." 26 One of the main reasons the Court is structured in its present form is due specifically to the U.S. efforts during the ICC development conferences in the 1990s. Not only as a world leader, but as a nation with a long tradition of a fair and effective judicial proceedings, U.S.
involvement during these first formative years of the Court and its first Review Conference in 2009 is an imperative. Choosing this path may gain back some of the leadership capital we've wasted by distancing ourselves from and being antagonistic to the ICC. But more importantly, it would also show the United States is serious about supporting the development of an international legal system to address atrocious behaviors and a method to enforce those laws so developed.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Is the United States further ahead strategically as a non-member of the ICC? The clear answer is no. It seems the concerns voiced by the United States are based on speculation of what might happen, rather than on hard evidence. Will the ICC, like the UN, be another venue for those countries antagonistic to U.S. policies to find a forum and a mechanism to criticize or attempt to thwart U.S. international efforts? Absolutely, but that is not sufficient justification to exclude ourselves from one of the most important developments in international law in world history.
After studying the history of the development of the International Criminal Court, examining how the United States was thoroughly engaged throughout the 1990s, and the evolution of the ICC since it came into existence, it seems evident the path that must be followed is clear, even if somewhat unpalatable to the current administration. The United States cannot pick and choose the occasions to exercise its world leadership. To try to be selective on when and where to step to the front of the international community undermines all the long-term interests of America. The United States must lead on this issue as well, to grant the imprimatur of the state with one of the most developed judicial systems in history and which has always seen the development of international law as the cornerstone of a peaceful and secure world. 
